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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Stephen

Davis appeals from the district court's order summarily

dismissing his "Motion for Injunction Post Conviction."

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On August 9, 2010, Davis filed a pleading entitled "Motion for Injunction
Post Conviction" ("Motion") in which he appears to seek consideration, or
reconsideration, of his trial attorney's alleged "gross negligence." (R., pp.1-7.)
Included within Davis's Motion is a request for counsel "for the limited purpose of
fully arguing th[e) Motion; or filing an amended U.P.C.P.A., ... and presenting of
[sic) a prima facia [sic) reason to proceed." (R., p.6.) The district court described
the course of Davis's case prior to the date he filed the Motion as follows:
On October 29, 1997, {Davis] was charged with one court of
rape under Idaho Code§ 18-6101 (3), and lewd conduct with a child
under sixteen under Idaho Code§ 18-1508. According to Davis,
sentence was later imposed for sexual battery under Idaho Code
18-1508A. Sentencing occurred on December 7, 1998 and the
terms of sentence were for 18 months fixed and 13 years
indeterminate. On November 9, 1999, {Davis] filed a Petition for
Post Conviction Relief ("Petition") alleging, among other things,
ineffective assistance of counsel, discovery of new evidence,
excessive punishment, habeas corpus, and timeliness. A hearing
was held concerning Davis's Petition on August 7, 2000. The Court
issued a Minute Entry and Order on August 10, 2000, which stated
that Davis's Petition was dismissed.
(R, p.13.)

Noting it was "difficult to discern" whether Davis's Motion was intended as
a "Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or a Motion to Vacate Judgment
or a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment," the district court entered a notice of
1

intent to dismiss the Motion, analyzing it as both a successive petition and a
motion to reconsider.

(R., pp.12-21.)

Treating the Motion as a successive

petition, the court advised Davis of its intent to dismiss the "petition" because
Davis failed to provide "sufficient admissible evidence to support his claims and
raise a genuine issue of material fact.''

(R., p.21.) The court further advised

Davis that if he intended his Motion as a request for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b) or
59(e), the Motion was untimely and Davis "failed to provide any facts that would
allow the Court to consider granting th[e] Motion." (R., p.20.) The court also
denied Davis's request for counsel and notified him he had twenty days to
respond to the court's notice.

(R., pp.17-19, 21.) Twenty-five days later, on

October 12, 2010, the court dismissed Davis's Motion, noting it had received no
response to the court's notice within the 20-day time period. (R., pp.23-24.)
Ten days later, on October 22, 2010, Davis filed a "reply" to the court's
notice of intent to dismiss in which he listed a number of cases for the court to
review for purposes of "res judicada [sic}," contended he "lacks the mental ability
to research, file, and litigate, a judicial action," asserted there was some
unidentified "state created barriers" that violated his due process rights, and
claimed he raised a genuine issue of material fact based on the "fact, the judges,
court clerks, and most attorneys of the Sixth District are knowledgable [sic] of the
misconduct and disbarment of Attorney Souza."

(R., pp.25-36.)

Davis also

asked the court to treat his Motion as "a first action, upon the fact no ajudication
[sic] occurred on prior U.P.C.P.A." (R., p.33.)

In conjunction with his "reply,"

Davis filed a motion to reconsider the court's dismissal order claiming "external
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factors of prison conditions did cause a delay in timely responding," although he
did not articulate what those conditions were. (R., p.38.)
The district court thereafter entered a second order dismissing Davis's
Motion concluding Davis "fail[ed] to show any new or additional information that
would justify reconsideration of th[e] Court's Intent to Dismiss and prior
Dismissal." (R., pp.39-40.) Davis timely appealed. (R., pp.42-46.) The State
Appellate Public Defender initially represented Davis on appeal, but withdrew
after concluding there was no viable issue to raise on appeal.

(R., p.74;

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw, p.9; Order Granting Motion for
Leave to Withdraw and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule.}

Davis, with the

Court's permission, thereafter filed a pro se "Informal Brief."

(Order Granting

Request for Permission for Filing a Non-Conforming Appellant's Brief.}
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ISSUES
Although Davis's brief includes a section entitled "Issues," this section
does not contain a "short and concise" statement of the issues as required by

I.AR. 35(a)(4), but instead contains what appear to be Davis' arguments on
appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.3-4.) The state phrases the issues on appeal as:
Has Davis failed to establish the district court erred in denying his request
for counsel or in summarily denying relief on his Motion?

4

ARGUMENT
Davis Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying His Request
For Counsel And Denying Relief On His Motion

A.

Introduction
Davis challenges the district court's denial of his request for counsel to

represent him on his Motion and the denial of relief on his Motion. (Appellant's
brief, pp.3-4.) Both of Davis' arguments fail. Application of the law to the facts
supports the district court's determination that Davis failed to establish the
possibility of a valid post-conviction claim that would entitle him to the
appointment of counsel. Davis has also failed to show error in the dismissal of
his

Motion whether treated

as

a successive

petition

or a motion for

reconsideration.

B.

Standard Of Review And Legal Standards Applicable To A District Court's
Decision To Grant Or Deny A Request For The Appointment Of Counsel
In Post-Conviction Proceedings
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is

governed by I.C. § 19-4904. The decision to grant or deny a request for courtappointed counsel lies within the discretion of the district court. Charboneau v.
State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Hust v. State, 147 Idaho
682, 683, 214 P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009).
unfettered, however.

The court's discretion is not

If the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts

showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further investigation on
the defendant's behalf," the court must appoint post-conviction counsel to assist
the petitioner in developing his or her claims. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,
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654,152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793,102 P.3d at 1112.
If, on the other hand, the claims in the petition are so patently frivolous that there
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with
the assistance of counsel and further investigation, the court may deny the
request for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing
meritless post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164
P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust, 147 Idaho at 684, 214 P.3d at 670.
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904 "permits the trial court to
determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. In reviewing the denial of a motion for
appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set
aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to
questions of law, this Court exercises free review." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho
676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001 ).

C.

Davis Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Request For The
Appointment Of Counsel To Pursue His Motion Or In The Dismissal Of His
Motion
Davis has failed to establish the district court erred in denying his request

for counsel because, as found by the district court, Davis' Motion, whether
treated as a successive petition or a motion to reconsider, was frivolous. (R.,
6

p.19.) Davis has likewise failed to establish he was entitled to a hearing or any
other relief on his Motion.
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA") provides:

"All

grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his
original, supplemental or amended application." I.C. § 19-4908. A successive
petition is allowed only if "the court finds a ground for relief asserted [in the
successive petition} which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was
inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application." I.C. §
19-4908; see also Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 933-34, 801 P.2d 1283, 128485 (1990); Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 496, 887 P.2d 39, 41 (Ct. App.
1994).
In interpreting I.C. § 19-4908, Idaho's appellate courts have held that
"[iJneffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel may provide sufficient
reason for permitting newly asserted allegations or allegations inadequately
raised in the initial application to be raised in a subsequent post-conviction
application." Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App.
2008) (footnote omitted) (citing Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 596, 635 P.2d
955, 960 (1981 ); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct.
App. 1999)).

If a petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of post-conviction

counsel as a basis for bringing a successive petition, the relevant inquiry is
"whether the second application has raised not merely a question of counsel's
performance but substantive grounds for relief from the conviction and sentence."
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Nguyen, 126 Idaho at 496, 887 P.2d at 41 (quoting Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho
337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 992 (Ct. App. 1987)).
It appears from Davis's Motion that he left it in the court's discretion as to
whether to treat the Motion as a successive petition or a motion to reconsider.
(See generally R., pp.1-7.)

If considered a successive petition, in order to be

entitled to the appointment of counsel, Davis was required to allege facts
showing the possibility of a valid claim that was either not raised or was
inadequately asserted in his original post-conviction action due to the ineffective
assistance of his original post-conviction attorney.

See Swader v. State, 143

Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007) (counsel must be appointed only if
petitioner alleges the possibility of a valid claim). Davis failed to do so. Indeed,
Davis's Motion states no clear claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but
merely alleges the Idaho State Bar found "J. Souza, act[ed] in 'gross negligence,'
of his duties and obligations to his clients."

(R., p.3.)

Moreover, there is no

evidence that this finding by the Idaho State Bar was even made in relation to
Davis's case.
As for a sufficient reason that would justify a successive petition, Davis
appears to claim he has experienced "procedural hurdles" or "state created
barriers" and "attorney misconduct by not assisting in presenting first [sic]
U.P.C.P.A." (R., pp.4-6, 33-34.) Although the "hurdles" and "barriers" to which
Davis refers are not entirely clear, to the extent he is claiming the "hurdles" or
"barriers" he faced in pursuing his first post-conviction case are related to his
"mental ability to research, file, and litigate, a judicial action" (R., p.26), the state
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is unaware of any basis for concluding this would be a sufficient reason for filing
a successive petition, particularly since Davis was apparently represented by
counsel during his first post-conviction action. With respect to Davis's claim that
his original post-conviction attorney engaged in "misconduct" by "not assisting in
presenting [his] first" petition, Davis has failed to allege any particular deficiency
in counsel's representation much less a deficiency adequate to find postconviction counsel either failed to raise a claim or inadequately pursued a claim
that was raised.
Because Davis has failed to show he raised the possibility of a valid claim
or a sufficient reason for filing a successive post-conviction petition, he has failed
to show error in the district court's denial of his request for counsel or the
summary dismissal of his Motion when considered as a successive petition.
Davis has likewise failed to show the district court erred in declining to
reconsider the denial of post-conviction relief.

In his Motion, Davis appears to

request reconsideraiion of the order dismissing his first post-conviction petition
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) and/or 60(b)(6). (R., p.2.) The district court declined
to afford Davis relief under either rule because Davis "failed to provide any facts
that would allow the Court to" do so and because any such request was untimely.
(R., p.20.) The district court was correct.
Rule 60(b), I.R.C.P. reads, in relevant part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b ); (3) fraud (whether
9

heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1 ), (2), (3) and (6) not more than
six (6) months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered
or taken.
Although a Rule 60(b) motion may be filed in the context of a postconviction case, State v. Heyrend, 129 Idaho 568, 572, 929 P.2d 744 (Ct. App.
1995), the rule provides a very specific time limit for filing such a motion, i.e., "for
reasons (1), (2), (3) and (6), [the motion shall be made] not more than six (6)
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." "[T]he
time requirement set forth in Rule 60(b) is jurisdictional and may not be extended
'except to the extent and under the conditions stated' in the Rule itself." Miller v.
Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 348, 924 P.2d 607 (1996). The term "made," as used in
the rule, requires that the motion be "filed prior to the six month time limit or is
served within that time period and then filed 'within a reasonable time thereafter."'

kl (quoting I.R.C.P. 5(d)(1)).
Davis sought relief under subsection (6) of Rule 60(b) (R., p.2); therefore,
he was required to file or serve the motion within six months of the date of the
order he was seeking to reconsider, i.e., the order denying post-conviction relief.
The order denying post-conviction relief was entered August 10, 2000. (See R.,
p.13.) Davis did not, however, file his Motion until August 9, 2010 (R., p.1), well
beyond the jurisdictional limit. Thus, even if he had stated an adequate reason
for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), which he did not, the Motion was untimely.
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Rule 59(e), l.R.C.P, also contains a time limit. Specifically, a motion filed
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e) to "alter or amend the judgment shall be served not
later than fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment."

Given that Davis'

Motion was untimely under the more generous timeframe available under Rule
60(b), it was also untimely under Rule 59(e).

The district court correctly

concluded as much and Davis has failed to establish this was error.
Because Davis has failed to establish the district court erred in denying his
request for counsel or in denying his Motion, he is not entitled to any relief on
appeal.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order
dismissing Davis's Motion.
DATED this 2oth day of September, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of September 2011, I caused
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
STEPHEN L. DAVIS
IDOC # 54361
ISCI
PO Box 14
Boise, ID 83707

JES ICA M. LORELLO
Dep ty Attorney General
JML/pm
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